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Abstract
Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics, and they could be even more
fascinating when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Liar’s paradox can be translated
into a propositional tautology, and Barber’s paradox turns into a first-order tautology. Russell’s
paradox, which collapsed Frege’s foundational framework, is now a classical theorem in set theory,
implying that no set of all sets can exist. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems;
Liar’s paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of
truth in sufficiently rich languages. This paradox (and also Richard’s paradox) appears implicitly in
Go¨del’s proof of his celebrated first incompleteness theorem. In this paper, we study Yablo’s paradox
from the viewpoint of first and second order logics. We prove that a formalization of Yablo’s paradox
(which is second-order in nature) is non-first-order-izable in the sense of George Boolos (1984).
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This was sometime a paradox, but now the time gives it proof.
— William Shakespeare (Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1).
1 Introduction
If mathematicians and philosophers have come to the conclusion that some (if not
almost all) of the paradoxes cannot be (re)solved, or as Priest [10, p. 160] puts it “the
programme of solving the paradoxes is doomed to failure”, they have learned to live
(and also get along) with the paradoxes; of course, as long as the paradoxes do not
crumble the foundations of our logical systems. Paradoxes have proved to be more
than puzzles or destructive contradictions; indeed they have been used in proofs of
some fundamental mathematico-logical theorems. Let us take the most well-known,
and perhaps the oldest, paradox: Liar’s paradox. When translated into the language
of logic, this paradox seems to claim the existence of a sentence λ such that λ←→¬λ
holds. Now, Liar’s paradox can turn into a propositional tautology: ¬(p←→ ¬p).
In fact, when trying to convince oneself about the truth of ¬(p←→¬p), one can see
that the supposed argument is not that much different from the argument of Liar’s
paradox. One can clearly see that the paradox becomes a (semantic) proof for that
tautology; hence the title of the article (which uses the above epigram of Shakespeare).
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Let us take a second example; Russell’s paradox. If there existed a set r such that
∀x(x ∈ r←→ x 6∈ x), then we would have a contradiction (the sentence r∈ r←→ r 6∈ r
which results from substituting x with r ). So, the sentence ¬∃y∀x(x∈ y↔x 6∈x) is
a theorem in the theory of sets, whose proof is nothing more than the argument of
Russell’s paradox. Going deeper into the proof (or the paradox), one can see that
no real set-theoretic properties of the membership relation (∈) is used. That is to
say that for an arbitrary binary relation s, the sentence ¬∃y∀x[s(y, x)←→¬s(x, x)]
is a first-order logical tautology (see [11, Exercise 12, p. 76]). Now, if we interpret
the predicate s(y, x) as “y shaves x”, then we get Barber’s paradox (due to Russell
again). More generally, for any formula ϕ(x, y) with the only free variables x and
y, the sentence ¬∃y∀x[ϕ(x, y)←→¬ϕ(x, x)] is a first-order logical tautology, whose
semantic proof is very similar to the argument of Russell’s or Barber’s paradox. In a
similar way, ¬∃X(2)∃y∀x[X(2)(x, y)←→¬X(2)(x, x)] is a second-order tautology.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in Yablo’s paradox [13, 14]∗; several papers
(that we do not cite all of them here) and one book [4] have been written on different
aspects of this paradox. Yablo’s paradox says that if there existed a sequence of
sentences {Yn}n∈N with the property that for all n∈N, the sentence Yn is true if and
only if Yk is untrue for every k >n, then we would have a contradiction, since none
of those sentences can have a truth value (the sentences Yn would be neither true
nor false). This paradox is humbly called by Yablo himself, the ω-Liar paradox. The
paradoxicality of the sequence {Yn}n∈N of sentences with the above property follows
form the observation that if Ym is true, for some m, then Ym+1, and also all Yk’s,
for k >m+1, should be untrue. So, by the falsity of Ym+1, there should exist some
j >m+1 such that Yj is true; a contradiction. Whence, all Ym’s should be untrue,
and so Y0 must be true; another contradiction!
2 Yablo’s Paradox in Seconc-Order Logic
For formalizing Yablo’s paradox in a (first-order or second-order) language, we first
abstract away even the order relation, that appears in the paradox, and replace it
with an arbitrary binary relation symbol R; see [6] for a non-arithmetical formulation
of Yablo’s paradox. Let us take Y1 to be the first-order scheme
¬∀x
(
ϕ(x)←→ ∀y[xRy → ¬ϕ(y)]
)
,
where ϕ(x) is an arbitrary first-order formula with the only free variable x. Here, the
sentences Yn are represented by ϕ(n), and the quantifiers of the form ∀k>n · · · are
represented by ∀k(kRn→· · · ).
Definition 2.1 (Y: Yablo’s Paradox in Second Order Logic)
Let Y be the following second-order sentence:
¬∃X(1)∀x
(
X(1)(x)←→ ∀y[xRy → ¬X(1)(y)]
)
,
where R is a fixed binary relation symbol. ✧
Some sufficient conditions for proving (Y1 and) Y are
∗A closely related paradox is Visser’s [12] which we do not study here.
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(A1): ∀x∃y(xRy), and (A2): ∀x, y, z (xRy ∧ yRz → xRz).
That is to say that (A1∧A2 → Y1 is a first-order tautology, and) A1∧A2 → Y is a
second-order tautology; see [9, 6]. None of these conditions are necessary for Y; for
example in the directed graph 〈D;R〉 with D={a, b, c} and R={(a, b), (a, c), (c, c)},
we have Y and A2 but not A1. Also, in the directed graph 〈D;R〉 with D= {a, b, c}
and R={(a, b), (b, c), (c, c)}, we have Y and A1 but not A2.
As a matter of fact, some weaker conditions than A1 ∧A2 can also prove (Y1 and)
Y. For example, the sentence
(A): ∀x∃y(xRy ∧ ∀z[yRz → xRz]),
suffices (see Theorem 2.3 below). To see that A is really weaker than A1 ∧ A2,
consider 〈D;R〉 with D = {a, b, c, d} and R = {(a, b), (b, c), (a, d), (b, d), (c, d), (d, d)}.
Then (D;R) does not satisfy A2, since it is not transitive (we have aRbRc but ¬aRc),
while it satisfies A, since for any x∈D we have xRd ∧ ∀z[dRz → xRz]. Even some
weaker conditions than A can prove (Y1 and) Y.
Definition 2.2 (Some Sufficient Conditions for Proving Y)
Let θ0(x) be the formula ∃y(xRy ∧ ∀z[yRz→xRz]).
For any n∈N, if θn(x) is defined, then let θn+1(x)=∃y(xRy ∧ ∀z[yRz→θn(z)]). ✧
We now show that {∀x θn(x)}n∈N is a decreasing sequence of sentences (i.e., every
sentence is stronger than its successor, in the sense that the sentence implies its
successor but not vice versa) that all imply (Y1 and) Y. Note that A = ∀x θ0(x).
Theorem 2.3 ( ∀x θ0(x) 6 ⊣⊢ · · · ∀x θn(x) 6 ⊣⊢ ∀x θn+1(x) 6 ⊣⊢ · · · 6 ⊣⊢ Y )
For every n∈N, we have
(1) ∀x θn(x)  Y; (2) ∀x θn(x)  ∀x θn+1(x); (3) ∀x θn+1(x) 2 ∀x θn(x).
Proof.:
(1): By induction on n. For n = 0, take a directed graph 〈D;R〉 and assume that
∀x θ0(x) holds in it. If a subset X⊆D satisfies ∀x(x∈X↔∀y[xRy→y 6∈X ]), then for
any a∈D, the assumption a∈X implies that there exists some b∈D such that aRb
and ∀z[bRz→aRz]. Now, by b 6∈X , there should exist some c∈D such that bRc and
c 6∈X . Also, aRc should hold, which is a contradiction with a∈X . Thus X=∅. But
then for any a∈D there should exist some b∈D with aRb and b∈X , and so X 6= ∅;
another contradiction. Thus, there exists no such X⊆D; whence, ∀x θ0(x)  Y.
Now, suppose that ∀x θn(x)  Y holds. Take a directed graph 〈D;R〉 and assume
that ∀x θn+1(x) holds in it. If for some X⊆D we have ∀x(x∈X↔∀y[xRy→y 6∈X ]),
then for any a∈D, there exists some b∈D such that aRb, and we have aRx for any
x in the set Db={z∈D | bRz}. Now, if Db 6=∅, then the directed graph 〈Db, R∩D2b 〉
satisfies ∀x θn(x), and so, by the induction hypothesis, the set X∩Db cannot exist.
So, we necessarily have Db= ∅. Now, if a∈X holds, then we should have that b 6∈X
and so there should exists some c ∈ Db with c 6∈ X ; a contradiction. Thus, X = ∅.
Then, for any a ∈ D, since a 6∈ X , there should exist some b with aRb and b ∈ X ;
another contradiction. This shows that ∀x θn+1(x)  Y.
(2): Suppose that ∀x θn(x) holds, and fix an x. There is some y such that xRy; and
for any z with yRz we have θn(z) by the assumption ∀x θn(x). So, ∀x θn+1(x) holds.
(3): Consider 〈D;R〉, with D= {a0, a1, · · · , a2n} and R= {(ai, ai+1) | 06 i < 2n} ∪
{(a2n, a2n)}. In the directed graph 〈D;R〉, obviously, ∀x θn+1(x) holds, but ∀x θn(x)
does not hold, since we have a2n−2Ra2n−1Ra2n but ¬(a2n−2Ra2n). ❑
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As a result, Y does not imply the sentence ∀x θn(x), for any n ∈ N. In the next
section, we show that no first-order sentence in the language of 〈R〉 is equivalent
with the second-order sentence Y. So, neither the sentence Y nor its negation ¬Y is
first-order-izable (see [2, 3]). Not only the second-order sentence Y is non-equivalent
with any first-order sentence, but also it is non-equivalent with any first-order theory
(which could contain infinitely many sentences). Actually, ¬Y is equivalent with the
existence of a kernel in a directed graph 〈D;R〉; see e.g. [1]. So, our result shows
that the existence or non-existence of a kernel in a directed graph is not equivalent
to any first-order sentence (in the language of directed graphs). Whence, Yablo’s
paradox, formalized as (Y1 or as) Y in Definition 2.1, does not turn by itself into
(a first-order or) a second-order tautology, and some conditions should be put on R
to make it a theorem. This paradox can be nicely translated into some theorems in
Linear Temporal Logic (see [8, 7]) or in Modal Logic (see [5]).
3 Non-first-orderizability of Yablo’s Paradox
Consider the language 〈s〉, where s is a unary function symbol. A standard structure
on this language is 〈N; s〉, where s is interpreted as the successor function: s(n)=n+1
for all natural numbers n∈N.
Definition 3.1 (Theory of Successor, and Kernel of a Directed Graph)
Let the theory S on the language 〈s〉 consist of the following axiom:
∀x, y [s(x)=s(y)→ x=y].
With any structure 〈M ; s〉, the directed graph 〈M ;R〉 is associated, where R is defined
by xRy ⇐⇒ y=s(x), for all x, y∈M .
For a directed graph 〈D;R〉, a subset K ⊆ D is called a Kernel, when it has the
following property: ∀x
(
x∈K ↔ ∀y[xRy→y 6∈K]
)
.
For a formula ϕ over the language 〈R〉, let ϕs result from ϕ by replacing each uRv
with s(u)=v for variables u, v; so, ϕs is a formula over the language 〈s〉. ✧
So, ¬Y states the existence of a Kernel in a directed graph with relation R, and
the s-translation of Yablo’s paradox Ys is equivalent with the second-order sentence
¬∃X(1)∀x
[
X(1)(x) ←→ ¬X(1)
(
s(x)
)]
. Any structure 〈M ; s〉 which satisfies S may
contain some copies of
N ≈ {a0, a1, a2, · · · }
with an+1 = s(an) for all n∈N, such that there is no a∈M with s(a) = a0. It may
also have some copies of
Z ≈ {· · · , a−2, a−1, a0, a1, a2, · · · },
in which am+1=s(am) for all m∈Z. There could be also some finite cycles
Zm ≈ {a, s(a), s
2(a), · · · , sm−1(a)} with sm(a)=a,
for some m>0. Let us note that, by the axiom S, no two copies of N or Z or a finite
cycle can intersect one another. Indeed, these are all a model 〈M ; s〉 of S can contain.
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Lemma 3.2 (Axiomatizability of ¬Ys+S)
The associated directed graph 〈D;R〉 of a model 〈M ; s〉 of S satisfies ¬Y, if and only
if 〈M ; s〉 has no odd cycles, if and only if the structure 〈M ; s〉 also satisfies the axioms
¬∃x(s2n+1(x)=x) for n∈N.
Proof.:
The second equivalence is straightforward; so, we prove the first equivalence only.
First, suppose that 〈M ; s〉 has no odd cycles. Then let K ⊆ M consist of the
even natural and integer numbers (as the copies of N and Z) of M (if any), and
the elements with even indices in the finite cycles of M ; i.e., for a finite even cycle
{a, s(a), s2(a), · · · , s2m+2(a) = a} take {a, s2(a), s4(a), · · · , s2m(a)}. Then the set K
is a kernel of 〈M ;R〉, since an element of M is in K, if and only if it is even indexed,
if and only if its successor is odd indexed, if and only if its successor is not in K.
Thus, 〈M ;R〉 satisfies ¬Y. This would have not been possible if there were an odd
cycle; i.e., an element α such that s2m+1(α) =α for some m> 0, since α would had
been odd and even indexed at the same time.
Second, suppose that the directed graph 〈M ;R〉 associated to 〈M ; s〉 has a kernel
K, and also (for the sake of a contradiction) that 〈M ; s〉 has an odd cycle such as
{a, s(a), s2(a), · · · , s2m+1(a) = a}, for some m > 0. Then, if a ∈ K, then s(a) 6∈ K,
then · · · s2m(a) ∈ K, and so a = s2m+1(a) 6∈ K, a contradiction. Also, if a 6∈ K,
then s(a)∈K, then · · · s2m(a) 6∈K, and so a= s2m+1(a)∈K, a contradiction again.
Therefore, if 〈M ;R〉 has a kernel, then 〈M ; s〉 can have no odd cycle. ❑
Theorem 3.3 (Non-First-Order-izability of Y and ¬Y)
The second-order sentence Y is not equivalent with any first-order sentence.
Proof.:
If there were a first-order sentence in the language 〈R〉 equivalent to Y, then by
Lemma 3.2, S ′=S∪{¬∃x(s2n+1(x)=x) | n∈N} would be finitely axiomatizable (see
[11, Lemma 4.2.9]). But this is not true, since for any finite subset of this theory,
there exists a structure that satisfies that finite sub-theory but is not a model of the
whole theory S ′: it suffices to take a sufficiently large odd cycle. ❑
Thus, there can exist no first-order sentence η such that the second-order sentence
η↔ Y is a logical tautology. As a result, the proposed formalization Y of Yablo’s
paradox in Definition 2.1, being second-order in nature, is not (equivalent with any)
first-order (sentence). We end the paper with a stronger result: there cannot exist any
first-order theory that is equivalent with Y. So, Yablo’s paradox is not even infinitely
first-order (i.e., it is non-equivalent even with any theory that consists of an infinite
set of first-order sentences).
Theorem 3.4 (Non-Equivalence of Y With First-Order Theories)
The second-order sentence Y is not equivalent with any first-order theory.
Proof.:
By Lemma 3.2, the theory ¬Ys+S is axiomatizable over 〈s〉; if Ys were axiomatizable,
then by [11, Lemma 4.2.10] the theory ¬Ys+S would be finitely axiomatizable. But
this contradicts Theorem 3.3. So, Ys is not axiomatizable, hence Y is not equivalent
with any first-order theory. ❑
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We conjecture that the second-order sentence ¬Y, too, is non-equivalent with all
the first-order theories. This does not concern the main topic of this article, since the
sentence ¬Y does not express Yablo’s paradox, while Y does that.
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